According to Gilmore's website, he was offered the option of going through a more strict check, but declined:

John then went to San Francisco International Airport and attempted to fly to Washington, DC on United Airlines.  There he was informed that if he was not willing to show ID he could fly, but only if he submitted to a far more intrusive search than what every passenger goes through at the security checkpoint.

He politely declined the search and again was not allowed to fly.

So basically, Gilmore's complaint is that airlines require security checks at all, however notional. To which I can only say, if it matters that much to you, buy your own damn Cessna.

As a security professional, what do you think about the TSA in general?

I think that in general the organization does what it means to do -- which is to give a sense of security when people are travelling by air.

The TSA strives to create a perception that events like 9/11 are not repeatable or at least exceedingly hard to repeat. For the most part it seems as if that view of reality is well believed by air travellers.

From a security perspective -- nothing could be further from the truth. There are significant security gaps in the protocols for access  to Air Cargo planes (a 747 filled with Dell Computers is just as effective when crashed into a building as one filled with passengers), major risks associated with manpads (surface-air missiles) when planes are taking off/landing, and critical risks associated with the protocols for dealing with passengers.

Since you are probably most familiar with passenger protocols I'll go over a few:
The focus of the TSA is on screening rather than on vulnerability detection. As a result the key to defeating TSA security is to get past screening.

1. Since IDs are only checked/reconciled with boarding passes at the security checkpoint: You can always buy a real ticket under a fake name, and then print a fake boarding pass to get past the security checkpoint. This allows people on the "no-fly" list to fly if they so choose. In addition visual checks of ID by the TSA is unable to provide any actual verification -- there are over 50 forms of photo identification that a TSA agent must contend with, training amounts to reconciling the picture in a photo id with whoever presents it. No bad guy is going to have an ID which says "I'm a terrorist"..there is virtually no security gained from ID authentication under the current system.

2. Plastic/Ceramic blades are not detectable

3. All TSA screening measures are completely predictable. Take for example taking laptops outside their cases -- all laptops carry miniature bombs i.e. their batteries. Confirming that the laptops indeed have bombs in them is all that the TSA does.

Essentially all the measures currently practiced by the TSA are fundamentally flawed.

Then we move on to organizational culture and morale. The TSA has a high turnover rate such that the people whom its employees tend to be always "new" at their jobs. The reasons for this are pretty much associated with the cultural model of the TSA -- people given power over others without strong institutional structure veer easily towards abuse.

In my mind it would be far better to remove all the current security checks and spend the money on air marshalls.

Memory is a strange bell, jubilee and knell.

<i>The TSA strives to create a perception that events like 9/11 are not repeatable or at least exceedingly hard to repeat.<i>

I would think that they are more difficult to repeat.  This was a lesson learn in less than an hour by the passengers of flight 93. Combined with the awareness of passengers that allowing terrorist to get control of a plane was tantamount to death (an hence giving them a reason to resist), we also have reinforce cockpit doors and reinforced procedures for the flight crew to not allow admittance to the flight deck.  That pretty much ends the game of using passenger planes as weapons.

<i>From a security perspective -- nothing could be further from the truth. There are significant security gaps in the protocols for access  to Air Cargo planes (a 747 filled with Dell Computers is just as effective when crashed into a building as one filled with passengers), major risks associated with manpads (surface-air missiles) when planes are taking off/landing, and critical risks associated with the protocols for dealing with passengers.</i>

Ahhh, is see what you meant about "events <b>like</b> 9/11". I don't think anyone assumes checking ID is going to prevent a Surface to Air missile for being used.  As far as Air Cargo, I just assume the people flying those planes are checked by someone, at the very least the other pilots.

Since IDs are only checked/reconciled with boarding passes at the security checkpoint: You can always buy a real ticket under a fake name, and then print a fake boarding pass to get past the security checkpoint.

But doesn't the airline have to reconcile the boarding passes at the gate?

I would think that they are more difficult to repeat.  This was a lesson learn in less than an hour by the passengers of flight 93. Combined with the awareness of passengers that allowing terrorist to get control of a plane was tantamount to death (an hence giving them a reason to resist), we also have reinforce cockpit doors and reinforced procedures for the flight crew to not allow admittance to the flight deck.  That pretty much ends the game of using passenger planes as weapons.

Allow me to draw your attention to TK1476 - a flight on turkish airlines on Oct 3, 2006 (i.e. last year) where not only was the plane hijacked, but the cabin was breached quite simply -- i.e. when the flight attendants entered to server the crew.

There are two things worth noting about TK1476 -- the "reinforced cockpit doors" idea didn't count for squat, and the "passengers assaulting the hijackers" also didn't happen.

In my opinion this demonstrates that given the right circumstance its perfectly possible to hijack a passenger airline even after 9/11.

But doesn't the airline have to reconcile the boarding passes at the gate?

All the airline checks at the gate is that you have a valid boarding pass. There have been times when my wife and I fly that she used my boarding pass to board and I hers. As long as the machine flashes "green" no checks are made to ensure that the boarding pass presented is yours.

So then in a made-for-tv movie plot here is what you need to do as a bad guy:

1. Buy ticket in the name of Jim Patriot Wilson from any online website -- method of payment need not contain the same name as that on the ticket; it helps if you use a stolen credit card number available from many online "underground" forums.
   
2. Print your boarding pass before arriving at the airport.
   
3. Print a -separate- fake boarding pass in the name of Osama Bin Laden.
   
4. Go to airport and present your fake boarding pass along with your biometrically , fingerprint certified "Osama Bin Laden" drivers license/passport/ID.
   
5. Pass through security after being singled out for  extra search "travelling while looking like a foreigner".
   
6. Pass through screening successfully (with your ceramic knife embedded in the lining or base of your luggage) sincethe name on your oarding pass matches your legitimate ID.
   
6. Board airliner and order the kosher meal.

Naturally you can do variations on this but the key point is that the security checks at the airport does little if anything for security.

Memory is a strange bell, jubilee and knell.