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Re: Certainty
Thu Jun 14, 2007 at 01:10:47 AM EST
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There are two reasons why I think this will be overturned. One of the big reasons is the one I mentioned above: that this ruling gives actual spies and saboteurs more protection than uniformed enemy soldiers. That might not seem like a very big deal when it's just one guy, but the law won't be in place for just this one case. (Nor will it be in place only until 2009, so the common complaint of "I don't trust this administration!" is a moot point.)
The second reason is that I see the majority opinion as stepping on the toes of SCOTUS. This decision uses a procedural rationale to avoid the laws passed in the wake of the Hamdi decision, saying basically that al-Marri can't fit the criteria because he was detained too long. On a strictly letter-of-the-law reading, they have a point. But recall that Hamdi was decided in a way which obligated Congress to clear up the law; SCOTUS did not impose a judgement criteria by fiat. For an appellate court to then come out with a ruling which potentially penalizes the American public's safety because of that ruling is a slap in the face. The majority of the 6-3 Hamdi ruling was composed of the more liberal SCOTUS justices under Rehnquist, and the more recently-placed members are even less friendly to the idea of imposing judicial litmus tests than their predecessors; so, the appeal court has pretty much alienated the entire SCOTUS from the get-go.
(For those interested, Orin Kerr at the Volokh Conspiracy blog has a few different posts on the subject.)
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Re: Certainty
Thu Jun 14, 2007 at 08:41:31 AM EST
4.50 (astute)
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the common complaint of "I don't trust this administration!" is a moot point
I don't trust the next administration either. It
is a valid complaint.
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Re: Certainty
Thu Jun 14, 2007 at 04:50:04 PM EST
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If I don't trust Woodrow Wilson, do I have a valid complaint against paying income tax?
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Re: Certainty
Thu Jun 14, 2007 at 05:13:29 PM EST
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If I don't trust Woodrow Wilson, do I have a valid complaint against paying income tax?
Due to the 16th Amendment, you would not have a valid complaint.
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Re: Certainty
Fri Jun 15, 2007 at 08:36:54 PM EST
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Well, the AUMF builds on the Constitutional powers granted to the Executive for the purpose of national defense. So, we're back to "not a valid complaint" as I said in the first place.
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Re: Certainty
Sat Jun 16, 2007 at 08:24:24 AM EST
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Are you seriously suggesting that holding someone, without charges, indefinitely, is "force" in the context of the AUMF? If so, do you see any limit to the presidents authority or range of actions under the AUMF?
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I Think So
Sat Jun 16, 2007 at 09:51:49 AM EST
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The key premise, the key assumption, is whether or not we're "at war." Gerry sides with the argument (but don't let me put words in your mouth if I'm wrong) that al Quaida represents an enemy worth the "war" label, and that's likely the same argument the administration is trying to make. If you don't accept that premise, this is an incredible extension of Executive power, a militarizing of the civilian legal system, and a dangerous step toward fascism to boot. No wonder passions are high on both sides, eh?
Personally, I don't see it, but that's for the courts to decide. I don't think Stevens is going to buy the argument either, which is why I questioned the assumption of an overruling in the first place. The 4th Circuit doesn't matter, IMO, only one Justice on the Supremes. So it goes . . .
Ex ignorantia ad sapientiam; e luce ad tenebras
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Re: I Think So
Sat Jun 16, 2007 at 12:42:01 PM EST
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That's it in a nutshell, uncarved.
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Re: Certainty
Sat Jun 16, 2007 at 12:39:33 PM EST
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Are you seriously suggesting that holding someone, without charges, indefinitely, is "force" in the context of the AUMF?
I am suggesting that:
A) a criminal court dismissing charges against a foreign national on procedural grounds is not the same thing as a foreign national being without charges,
B) holding someone is a better guarantee of human rights than the murder of some large number of others,*
C) "indefinitely" means exactly the same thing here as it did to German soldiers captured in 1941, and
D) detainment of enemy soldiers is a well-established use of the executive authority to wage war, as established in the Constitution.
If so, do you see any limit to the presidents authority or range of actions under the AUMF?
The limits I see are those clearly established in the AUMF: force is only authorized against those persons or groups responsible for the 9/11 attacks, and their adherents. Do you think it's really so hard to not have contact with al-Qaeda?
* Considering our death penalty debates, why am I having to make this argument here? Surely you can't believe that, of all the world's governments and political groups, only the US government has no right to execute the innocent?
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Re: Certainty
Sat Jun 16, 2007 at 05:41:08 PM EST
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A) a criminal court dismissing charges against a foreign national on procedural grounds is not the same thing as a foreign national being without charges
I'm not sure what you're trying to point out. No one has disputed that al Marri is being held without charges.
B) holding someone is a better guarantee of human rights than the murder of some large number of others
Better safe than sorry? That is an absurd argument in the context of the US Constitution.
C) "indefinitely" means exactly the same thing here as it did to German soldiers captured in 1941, and
D) detainment of enemy soldiers is a well-established use of the executive authority to wage war, as established in the Constitution
You are claiming that al Marri is an enemy soldier? That is quite the opposite of what the president is claiming: the very term "enemy combatant" was invented to differentiate captured terrorist suspects from the "well-established" laws that govern ordinary war.
Anyway, you have avoided answering my question, so I'll ask it again: Are you seriously suggesting that holding someone, without charges, indefinitely, is "force" in the context of the AUMF? Is "force" whatever the president says it is, or are there limits to the range of acts that the president may take against suspected members of al Qaeda?
Surely you can't believe that, of all the world's governments and political groups, only the US government has no right to execute the innocent?
The US government has no right to execute the innocent. I have no idea why you are bringing that point up - would you care to explain?
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Re: Certainty
Sun Jun 17, 2007 at 12:49:05 AM EST
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No one has disputed that al Marri is being held without charges.
zyx, it's disputed right in the dissent to the opinion above; al-Marri is being held because documents uncovered by the government explicitly tie him to al-Qaeda, and two previous arrests (dismissed due to lack of standing) show his behavior to be in complete accord with the training he's had with al-Qaeda. The charge is "being an al-Qaeda operative," which invokes the AUMF.
You are claiming that al Marri is an enemy soldier?
I'm claiming that al-Marri is the non-state functional equivalent of a spy or saboteur, which falls under military authority.
Anyway, you have avoided answering my question
I'm not avoiding it, I'm telling you that it's a nonsense question, for all the reasons above. You might as well be asking "how far is green?" What I am suggesting is that holding someone identified by al-Qaeda documents as an agent, who in addition has acted both against US law and in a manner consistent with being an al-Qaeda agent, until such time as al-Qaeda and the US have ceased hostilities is, in fact, "force" under the AUMF.
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Re: Certainty
Sun Jun 17, 2007 at 08:25:51 AM EST
5.00 (astute)
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it's disputed right in the dissent to the opinion above...The charge is "being an al-Qaeda operative," which invokes the AUMF
The dissent says no such thing: you made that up.
I'm claiming that al-Marri is the non-state functional equivalent of a spy or saboteur, which falls under military authority
I agree with that. The most closely analogous case was decided in
Ex Parte Quirin, where the US Supreme Court said that under the Articles of War the president had the authority to order military tribunals for spies or saboteurs captured on US soil. But there is a fundamental difference between how saboteurs were handled then and how the Bush Administration has handled al Marri: Spies in World War II were charged with crimes, put on trial, and allowed to argue their case.
Ex Parte Quirin said, in part,
(1) That the charges preferred against petitioners on which they are being tried by military commission appointed by the order of the President of July 2, 1942, allege an offense or offenses which the President is authorized to order tried before a military commission. (2) That the military commission was lawfully constituted
Al Marri is being held without charge, and there are apparently no plans on the part of the Bush Administration to put him on trial, whether before a military tribunal or a civilian court.
What I am suggesting is that holding someone identified by al-Qaeda documents as an agent, who in addition has acted both against US law and in a manner consistent with being an al-Qaeda agent, until such time as al-Qaeda and the US have ceased hostilities is, in fact, "force" under the AUMF
What
I am saying is that "force" does not, and cannot, mean that the president may take any action he wishes. The president is still constrained by the Constitution and the laws of the United States.
You have said that al Marri "has acted both against US law and in a manner consistent with being an al-Qaeda agent," and the evidence as we know it supports that. Why, then, should al Marri not be treated as someone who has broken the law? Why not charge him, whether before a properly constituted tribunal or in civilian court? Our system of laws says that the president has to do one or the other - the president may not arbitrarily change the law and call that change the "use of force."
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Re: Certainty
Mon Jun 18, 2007 at 10:31:06 AM EST
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The dissent says no such thing: you made that up.
It does, and I didn't. The dissent explicitly notes the government declaration filed by Joint Intelligence Task Force for Combating Terrorism Director Jeffrey Rapp, on page 82. I even excerpted that very quote in this response to Thalia here. That specific declaration was used to invoke the AUMF, and it was good enough for the lower court to decide in the government's favor.
Why, then, should al Marri not be treated as someone who has broken the law? Why not charge him, whether before a properly constituted tribunal or in civilian court?
He was charged -- twice, on a total of eight different counts. But, ha-ha! Those cases were dismissed for lack of standing ("Lack of venue" was the specific ground quoted in both cases. If I understand this correctly, this is due to some transactions of the crimes taking place outside the US. But, IANAL.) Al-Marri can't be charged again for those same crimes, as that would be double jeopardy. So, the alternatives available to the government were detain him, or let him go and wait for him to commit more crimes. I think they made the right choice.
I also think that this isn't the gross overreach of authority you and others seems to. A debatable choice, sure -- and the courts are debating it (as are we). The president isn't changing the laws at whim. The executive branch was legally granted authority, and it's exploring the limits of that authority. The questions which have arisen are largely due to the unconcern we as a nation have paid to this set of issues over the years.
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Re: Certainty
Mon Jun 18, 2007 at 06:17:50 PM EST
4.00 (interesting)
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The dissent explicitly notes the government declaration filed by Joint Intelligence Task Force for Combating Terrorism Director Jeffrey Rapp, on page 82. I even excerpted that very quote in this response to Thalia here. That specific declaration was used to invoke the AUMF, and it was good enough for the lower court to decide in the government's favor
That declaration is not a criminal charge. Above you claimed that "being an al-Qaeda operative" is a criminal charge, but it is not, and the dissent doesn't say it is.
He was charged -- twice, on a total of eight different counts. But, ha-ha! Those cases were dismissed for lack of standing ("Lack of venue" was the specific ground quoted in both cases. If I understand this correctly, this is due to some transactions of the crimes taking place outside the US. But, IANAL.) Al-Marri can't be charged again for those same crimes, as that would be double jeopardy
Dismissal of charges is not an acquittal; double jeopardy would not apply. And since those charges
were dismissed, that goes to prove my point that he is being held without charges.
So, the alternatives available to the government were detain him, or let him go and wait for him to commit more crimes
AL Marri could have been held, legally, as a material witness, but there was no other legal means for the government to keep him imprisoned. I know that you think the government made the right decision, but at least have the intellectual honesty to admit that they were acting illegally and unconstitutionally. Read the
text of the AUMF. It clearly is about the use of military force, not expanded police powers for the executive. There are other laws under which al Marri could have been charged if he had attended an al Qaeda training camp, which is what has been claimed.
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Re: Certainty
Tue Jun 19, 2007 at 10:48:20 AM EST
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That declaration is not a criminal charge.
I agree. It is not a criminal charge. It is, however, still a charge -- a formal assertion of offenses by al-Marri against the United States suitable for military jurisdiction.
Dismissal of charges is not an acquittal; double jeopardy would not apply.
Fair enough. I misunderstood that part of the law.
Read the text of the AUMF. It clearly is about the use of military force, not expanded police powers for the executive.
The military acts under the direction of the executive office -- the president is, after all, the Commander in Chief of the armed forces. And detaining combatants is an appropriate use of military force, and always has been.
I know that you think the government made the right decision, but at least have the intellectual honesty to admit that they were acting illegally and unconstitutionally.
I would if I believed that, but I don't. I recognize that al-Marri is getting the worst of all possible worlds: long detention, then (most likely) a military tribunal. I'm OK with that because al-Marri is the worst of all possible worlds: a member of a non-state enemy group sworn to work in secret to destroy the United States and its citizens. There is nothing that can convince me the intent of the Constitution is to protect the right to destroy the country -- "not a suicide pact," and so on. Any reading of constitutional rights which has the functional effect of protecting the right of destruction is absurd.
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Re: Certainty
Tue Jun 19, 2007 at 01:21:39 PM EST
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It is not a criminal charge. It is, however, still a charge -- a formal assertion of offenses by al-Marri against the United States suitable for military jurisdiction
You are wrong for three reasons:
First, and most obviously, an assertion of jurisdiction is not a criminal charge.
Second, the military has not charged al Marri with anything and seemed to have no plans to do so at the time this case was argued. From the decision,
In the four years since the President ordered al-Marri detained as an enemy combatant, the Government has completed CSRTs for each of the more than five hundred detainees held at Guantanamo Bay. Yet it was not until November 13, 2006, the very day the Government filed its motion to dismiss the case at hand, that the Government even suggested that al-Marri might be given a CSRT. At that time the Government proffered a memorandum from Deputy Secretary of Defense Gordon England directing that al-Marri be provided a CSRT "upon dismissal" of this case. This memorandum is too little too late
Third, and finally, nether the Military Commissions Act (MCA) nor the Detainee Treatment Act (DTA) apply to aliens captured on US soil,
Congress sought to eliminate the statutory grant of habeas jurisdiction for those aliens captured and held outside the United States who could not lay claim to constitutional protections, but to preserve the rights of aliens like al-Marri, lawfully residing within the country with substantial, voluntary connections to the
United States, for whom Congress recognized that the Constitution protected the writ of habeas corpus
...detaining combatants is an appropriate use of military force, and always has been
Determining what is "an appropriate use of military force" is not entirely under the purview of the executive. Congress can place limits on the extent of permissible force and on what range of actions properly constitute powers delegated to the military. In this case the limits are set forth in the MCA, DTA, and other laws such as the Patriot Act and earlier laws that deal with terrorism. You are suggesting that the president has unfettered authority, whether at home or abroad, as long as he claims that his actions are connected to the entities and events mentioned in the AUMF. That is not a reasonable interpretation of the words or history or context of the AUMF.
Any reading of constitutional rights which has the functional effect of protecting the right of destruction is absurd
I suggest you read the court's decision. It has no such functional effect since they plainly say that the only change to al Marri's status that they are ordering is the end to military detention and that "The Government can transfer al-Marri to civilian authorities to face criminal charges, initiate deportation proceedings against him, hold him as a material witness in connection with grand jury proceedings, or detain him for a limited time pursuant to the Patriot Act." Any of those choices would prevent al Marri from participating in the destruction of the United States.
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Re: Certainty
Tue Jun 19, 2007 at 03:32:42 PM EST
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In this case the limits are set forth in the MCA, DTA, and other laws such as the Patriot Act and earlier laws that deal with terrorism. You are suggesting that the president has unfettered authority, whether at home or abroad, as long as he claims that his actions are connected to the entities and events mentioned in the AUMF.
Nope. I'm suggesting that the AUMF grants authority to the president over the disposition of al-Marri, in accordance with the MCA, DTA, and so on.
I suggest you read the court's decision.
The court's decision was that the MCA and DTA didn't apply, which leads me to conclude the decision will be overturned. Or, possibly, that either one or both of the MCA and DTA will be ordered legislatively revised so that al-Marri's case can be considered. Either way, I don't expect this decision to stand.
Reduced to it's essense, the opinion states that the MCA can't apply because A) the declaration by Rapp I've noted above only counts as an intent by the government to determine al-Marri's standing (pages 16-20), and B) the government does not intend to determine al-Marri's standing (pages 20-26). In other words, it's nonsense. If the court wants to conclude that there must be a set length of time to determine an enemy combatant's status and that it must apply equally to cases where the US controls the ground and where it doesn't, fine -- but those calls must be addressed legislatively, not judicially.
Any of those choices would prevent al Marri from participating in the destruction of the United States.
Rebuttals of those choices in order: unless charges were dismissed for lack of standing, yet again; deportation wouldn't prevent a damn thing; only until the mandated limit for holding witnesses; only until the mandated limit to holds under the Patriot Act. All of those are almost assuredly less than "until the end of the conflict with al-Qaeda" and would be a equivalent of granting legal protections to a saboteur -- exactly the functional protection I'm complaining about.
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Re: Certainty
Tue Jun 19, 2007 at 05:53:01 PM EST
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the opinion states that the MCA can't apply because A) the declaration by Rapp I've noted above only counts as an intent by the government to determine al-Marri's standing (pages 16-20), and B) the government does not intend to determine al-Marri's standing (pages 20-26)
And C) Because the MCA and DTA were not intended by Congress to apply to anyone captured in the US, as I noted in my comment above. (They also quoted an Alberto Gonzales statement before Congress that supports their interpretation of Congressional intent and the scope of the DTA and MCA.)
If the court wants to conclude that there must be a set length of time to determine an enemy combatant's status and that it must apply equally to cases where the US controls the ground and where it doesn't, fine -- but those calls must be addressed legislatively, not judicially
It wasn't the length of time that was the problem, but the complete inaction on the part of the government to take the steps required under the DTA and MCA.
All of those are almost assuredly less than "until the end of the conflict with al-Qaeda" and would be a equivalent of granting legal protections to a saboteur -- exactly the functional protection I'm complaining about
You are ignoring the fact that there are already laws against terrorism, and that if al Marri truly did what is alleged in the presidential determination (that he "engaged in conduct that constituted hostile and war-like acts, including conduct in preparation for acts of international terrorism") then he can be charged criminally.
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Re: Certainty
Wed Jun 20, 2007 at 01:27:31 PM EST
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And C) Because the MCA and DTA were not intended by Congress to apply to anyone captured in the US, as I noted in my comment above.
I'm pretty sure the authors of the Commerce Clause never intended it to support gun-free school zones. If Congress wants the MCA and DTA to exclude enemies operating on US soil, they can amend the laws to make that explicit. (Or try to -- it would really be amusing to watch a Democrat-controlled Congress attempt to pass legislation which protects enemies within the US. Talk about feeding red meat to the opposition.)
It wasn't the length of time that was the problem, but the complete inaction on the part of the government to take the steps required under the DTA and MCA.
There's no way the court can rule that without creating law. Since the opinion neither castigates the government for it's role in holding men captured in Afghanistan for a theoretical 5-1/2 year maximum (at the time of the ruling) nor specifies when the final CSRT for those same took place, it can only engage in a process knows as "Making Shit Up" to find fault with al-Marri's 4-year detention. Furthermore, the opinion recognizes that the government held a hearing in accordance with CSRT protocol, then said the letter of the law wasn't good enough. I'll state that last again: the court ruled that following the letter of the law is not sufficient. Why that little bit of prestidigitation doesn't worry you, I don't know.
if al Marri truly did what is alleged in the presidential determination (that he "engaged in conduct that constituted hostile and war-like acts, including conduct in preparation for acts of international terrorism") then he can be charged criminally.
And if, as I suspect, this ruling is overturned, he can be charged militarily as well. Maybe it's me, but I don't see an overabundance of ways to stop terrorism as a problem, per se.
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Re: Certainty
Wed Jun 20, 2007 at 06:21:02 PM EST
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If Congress wants the MCA and DTA to exclude enemies operating on US soil, they can amend the laws to make that explicit
The DTA specifically mentions, "Detainees at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, and in Afghanistan and Iraq." I have also cited excerpts from the court's opinion that show they examined the legislative history of the MCA and even that the attorney general testified before Congress that the MCA would not statutorily remove
Habeas Corpus from anyone on US soil.
There is no need for Congress to amend these laws: the court read them correctly.
...the opinion recognizes that the government held a hearing in accordance with CSRT protocol...
I guess I missed that part. What I read (also cited above) was,
...it was not until November 13, 2006, the very day the Government filed its motion to dismiss the case at hand, that the Government even suggested that al-Marri might be given a CSRT. At that time the Government proffered a memorandum from Deputy Secretary of Defense Gordon England directing that al-Marri be provided a CSRT "upon dismissal" of this case
In other words, the government never had any intention of holding a CSRT for al Marri. Or maybe they just forgot. Either way, you cannot say they were adhering to the letter of the law.
Maybe it's me, but I don't see an overabundance of ways to stop terrorism as a problem, per se
Why not charge al Marri under existing laws?
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Re: Certainty
Fri Jun 22, 2007 at 03:09:35 PM EST
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Either way, you cannot say they were adhering to the letter of the law.
Enh, debatable. If I write articles and give speeches about how I'm not going to pay income tax, but still manage to get a 1040 form in the mail at 11:59pm on the last filing date, it still counts. Do I think the government was ass-covering? Sure. Do I think that makes it illegal? No.
Why not charge al Marri under existing laws?
That way had already failed twice.
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Re: Certainty
Mon Jun 18, 2007 at 10:40:44 AM EST
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He was charged -- twice, on a total of eight different counts. But, ha-ha! Those cases were dismissed for lack of standing ("Lack of venue" was the specific ground quoted in both cases. If I understand this correctly, this is due to some transactions of the crimes taking place outside the US. But, IANAL.) Al-Marri can't be charged again for those same crimes, as that would be double jeopardy. So, the alternatives available to the government were detain him, or let him go and wait for him to commit more crimes. I think they made the right choice.
Or they could have taken a third way in the first place. Perhaps just kept him under surveillance from the start until they were sure they had evidence on an actual, prosecutable crime instead of going off half-assed unprepared and arresting him for something that they were unable to convict him of in court. Then, when they actually had evidence of "terrorism" (if there ever was any) they could try him in public and we wouldn't be having this conversation right now.
I shudder to think what would happen if every criminal defendant was rounded up and tossed in the brig simply because the investigating law enforcement types screwed up the investigation.
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Re: Certainty
Mon Jun 18, 2007 at 11:24:52 AM EST
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Perhaps just kept him under surveillance from the start until they were sure they had evidence on an actual, prosecutable crime instead of going off half-assed unprepared and arresting him for something that they were unable to convict him of in court.
That's not a third way, that's the first way. That is "let him go." You seem to presume that surveillance would be any less subject to constitutional guarantees. So what happens if (when) al-Marri starts filing suits to prevent "government harassment"? Under your view, he still needs to be considered innocent, yes?
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Re: Certainty
Thu Jun 14, 2007 at 02:49:46 PM EST
4.00 (astute, astute)
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HOW do you know this person is an "actual spy or saboteur"? Last I checked, the U.S. government has not made any attempt to demonstrate this. Am I missing a conviction in a court that demonstrates such a status? Just because the Administration says someone is a spy or saboteur does not make them one. THAT is what the right to a trial is supposed to provide, identification of the "actual" spies and saboteurs v. those that are merely accused.
The reason why soldiers in uniform can be held as POWs, and that is not indefinite I might add, is because they are clearly identified as soldiers. You don't accidentally get into uniform & shoot at U.S. military targets. In contrast, you can be accused of being a terrorist for no real reason. THAT is why there is a Constitutional requirement that the government demonstrate in front of a neutral party (court) that the accusation is accurate.
Thalia
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20
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Re: Certainty
Thu Jun 14, 2007 at 05:00:39 PM EST
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HOW do you know this person is an "actual spy or saboteur"? Last I checked, the U.S. government has not made any attempt to demonstrate this.
Then you clearly haven't checked the opinion. From pages 6 and 7:
In February 2002, al-Marri was charged in the Southern District of New York with the possession of unauthorized or counterfeit credit-card numbers with the intent to defraud. A year later, in January 2003, he was charged in a second, six-count indictment, with two counts of making a false statement to the FBI, three counts of making a false statement on a bank application, and one count of using another person's identification for the purpose of influencing the action of a federally insured financial institution. Al-Marri pleaded not guilty to all of these charges. In May 2003, a federal district court in New York dismissed the charges against al-Marri for lack of venue.
[...]
In the order, President George W. Bush stated that he "DETERMINE[D] for the United States of America that" al-Marri: (1) is an enemy combatant; (2) is closely associated with al Qaeda; (3) "engaged in conduct that constituted hostile and war-like acts, including conduct in preparation for acts of international terrorism;" (4) "possesses intelligence . . . that . . . would aid U.S. efforts to prevent attacks by al Qaeda;" and (5) "represents a continuing, present, and grave danger to the national security of the United States." The President determined that al-Marri's detention by the military was "necessary to prevent him from aiding al Qaeda" and thus ordered the Attorney General to surrender al-Marri to the Secretary of Defense, and the Secretary of Defense to "detain him as an enemy combatant."
And from pages 82-83:
Like Padilla, al-Marri, an identified al Qaeda associate, was dispatched to the United States by the September mastermind as a "sleeper agent" and to explore computer hacking methods to disrupt the United States' financial system. Moreover, al-Marri volunteered for a martyr mission on behalf of al Qaeda, received funding from a known terrorist financier, and communicated with known terrorists by phone and e-mail. Decl. of Jeffrey N. Rapp, Director, Joint Intelligence Task Force for Combating Terrorism, ¶ 7, Sept. 9, 2004. It is also interesting to note that al-Marri arrived in the United States on September 10, 2001.
2Al-Marri not only failed to offer any evidence on his behalf, he refused to even participate in the initial evidentiary process. Al-Marri, 443 F. Supp. 2d at 785.
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Re: Certainty
Wed Jun 20, 2007 at 10:43:20 AM EST
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In February 2002, al-Marri was charged in the Southern District of New York with the possession of unauthorized or counterfeit credit-card numbers with the intent to defraud. A year later, in January 2003, he was charged in a second, six-count indictment, with two counts of making a false statement to the FBI, three counts of making a false statement on a bank application, and one count of using another person's identification for the purpose of influencing the action of a federally insured financial institution. Al-Marri pleaded not guilty to all of these charges. In May 2003, a federal district court in New York dismissed the charges against al-Marri for lack of venue.
I bet thousands a year get charged with white collar crimes like this.
In the order, President George W. Bush stated that he "DETERMINE[D] for the United States of America that" al-Marri: (1) is an enemy combatant; (2) is closely associated with al Qaeda; (3) "engaged in conduct that constituted hostile and war-like acts, including conduct in preparation for acts of international terrorism;" (4) "possesses intelligence . . . that . . . would aid U.S. efforts to prevent attacks by al Qaeda;" and (5) "represents a continuing, present, and grave danger to the national security of the United States." The President determined that al-Marri's detention by the military was "necessary to prevent him from aiding al Qaeda" and thus ordered the Attorney General to surrender al-Marri to the Secretary of Defense, and the Secretary of Defense to "detain him as an enemy combatant."
It's a good thing we can take the word of the president at face value to be equal to that or higher than the weight of a judge and jury convicting a person. Or not.
Like Padilla, al-Marri, an identified al Qaeda associate, was dispatched to the United States by the September mastermind as a "sleeper agent" and to explore computer hacking methods to disrupt the United States' financial system. Moreover, al-Marri volunteered for a martyr mission